Government size and openness: Evidence from the commodity boom in Latin America by Vianna, Andre & Mollick, Andre V.
University of Texas Rio Grande Valley 
ScholarWorks @ UTRGV 
Economics and Finance Faculty Publications 
and Presentations 
Robert C. Vackar College of Business & 
Entrepreneurship 
2018 
Government size and openness: Evidence from the commodity 
boom in Latin America 
Andre Vianna 
Andre V. Mollick 
The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.utrgv.edu/ef_fac 
 Part of the Finance Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Vianna, Andre and Mollick, Andre V., "Government size and openness: Evidence from the commodity 
boom in Latin America" (2018). Economics and Finance Faculty Publications and Presentations. 34. 
https://scholarworks.utrgv.edu/ef_fac/34 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Robert C. Vackar College of Business & 
Entrepreneurship at ScholarWorks @ UTRGV. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics and Finance Faculty 
Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ UTRGV. For more information, 
please contact justin.white@utrgv.edu, william.flores01@utrgv.edu. 
1 
 
Government size and openness: Evidence from the commodity boom in Latin 
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Abstract 
Does government size increase to compensate for the volatility that arises from openness? We 
evaluate this compensation hypothesis by focusing on Latin America, whose economic growth in 
the 2000s has been often attributed to the commodity boom. Panel data regressions show that 
during the 2003-2010 commodity boom terms of trade volatility has positive effects on 
government size compared to the earlier 1990-2002 period. This key finding supports the 
compensation hypothesis, a result robust to dynamic panels allowing for reverse causation from 
government size to the real economy. Policy implications include diversification of the 
production structure and strengthening of regulatory framework. 
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Government size and openness: Evidence from the commodity boom in Latin 
America. 
 
1. Introduction  
Much has been written in the literature regarding the causal relationships between 
openness and government size (normally measured as government expenditures over GDP, or 
G/Y). In an influential paper, Rodrik (1998) proposes a general equilibrium model to explain this 
with the government as the “safe” sector in terms of employment not subject to external risk. He 
shows that government size increases, however, to compensate for the volatility that arises from 
more trade openness. 
The current paper examines the 2000s commodity boom period for more recent evidence 
on Rodrik’s (1998) compensation hypothesis through the channel of terms-of-trade volatility.  
Revisiting this hypothesis is crucial for at least two reasons. One is because of the risks 
associated with a larger government size. For instance, since countries may desire to implement 
trade policies that foster more openness, the potential budgetary effects (larger government 
expenditures) may lead to the need for further adoption of public policies. Our paper brings into 
the discussion that fiscal risk prevention mechanisms such as sovereign wealth funds and the 
diversification of the production structure are some of the public policies that could minimize the 
risks coming from the sticky nature of government spending especially in times of economic 
busts. Another reason for the relevance of this research is that existing studies with terms-of-
trade volatility have focused on long-run relationships. Examples include Islam (2004), whose 
time series analysis is not supportive of the proposition in Rodrik (1998) and Epifani and Gancia 
(2009) for panel data, whose long-run conclusion is that globalization may have led to 
inefficiently large governments as evidenced by the significance of the openness (share of 
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imports plus exports over GDP) coefficients but not from terms-of-trade volatility. Is it possible 
that the 2000s commodity boom price volatility has contributed to some response of government 
size to terms-of-trade volatility in Rodrik’s (1998) compensation hypothesis? 
The 2000s is important due to the increase in international trade in commodity-exporting 
countries such as the Latin American economies studied in this paper. Previous work on Latin 
American economies by Lizardo and Mollick (2009) finds a negative relationship between 
government size and economic growth, while Blanco and Grier (2012) find that different sub-
categories of natural resource output (petroleum, agriculture) have different effects on physical 
and human capital accumulation. We reconsider these economies in this study, in which over the 
25-year period government size (as the mean of 18 countries) has moved from a little more than 
10% in 1990 to almost 14% in 2014. This paper investigates whether this upward trend in 
government size is due to characteristics of the business cycle or represents a response to 
external shocks – such as to terms of trade (TOT) volatility – as Rodrik (1998) suggests. We find 
strong support for the latter, especially during the commodity price boom of the 2000s. 
 
 
2. Literature Review and the case for Latin America 
2.1 General Literature Review 
Rodrik (1998) posits that the positive correlation between an economy's exposure to 
international trade and the size of its government exists because government spending plays a 
risk-reducing role in economies exposed to a significant amount of external risk. Therefore, an 
increase in government size is associated with an effort to compensate for the volatility that 
arises from openness. This relationship has been referred to as the “compensation hypothesis” in 
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International Economics. Some authors such as Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) cast doubt on the 
direct link between openness and government consumption, arguing that this link is mediated by 
country size, by showing that smaller countries have a larger share of public consumption in 
GDP, and are also more open to trade. Ram (2009), however, uses fixed-effects panel data 
regressions in the period 1960–2000 for 154 countries and argues that the positive association 
between openness and government size does not seems to arise due to the mediating role of 
country size. Kimakova (2009) revisits government size and openness for financial openness 
(gross private capital flows/GDP) for panel data and finds that economies with greater exposure 
to cross-border capital flows tend to have larger government size. Theoretical work by Epifani 
and Gancia (2009) proposes a mechanism on how openness can increase government size 
through two channels: (1) a terms-of-trade externality, with trade lowering the domestic cost of 
taxation; and (2) the demand for insurance, whereby trade raises risk and public transfers. The 
key parameter is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods and evidence 
is provided on the positive association between government size and openness. More recently, 
Jetter and Parmeter (2015) revisit the role of country size and find that the results differ 
significantly depending on the data source used. In addition, Benarroch and Pandey (2008, 2012) 
use both aggregate and disaggregated government expenditure data and find no evidence to 
support the relationship between openness and government size. 
This topic can be better understood from the viewpoints of a larger literature that links 
natural resources to the real economy, such as Gerelmaa and Kotani (2016), who find that from 
1970 to 1990 the resource curse holds but not from 1990 to 2010. Badeeb et al. (2017) contain an 
up-to-date literature review of the evolution of the natural resource curse thesis and propose five 
main causal mechanisms. First, the “Dutch disease” in which natural resource booms increase 
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domestic income and demand for goods leading to inflation and real exchange rate appreciation, 
creating both “spending” effects (which have a negative effect on growth) and “pull” effects 
(which have a negative effect on non-resource sectors). Second, volatility in commodity prices 
increases uncertainty and reduces economic growth. The recent paper by Moradbeigi and Law 
(2016) is an example for 63 oil producing countries during 2000-2010 showing economic growth 
volatility responding negatively to oil terms of trade volatility. A third causal mechanism is 
economic mismanagement as natural resource revenues lead to overconfident policymakers. 
Fourth, rent seeking over the windfall of resource revenues increases the power of elites. Fifth, 
windfall resource revenues, rather than broadly based taxation, can make governments less 
accountable, putting downward pressure on institutional quality and lowering growth in turn. By 
examining the determinants of government size, this study might suggest another possible causal 
mechanism of a resource curse, as the mechanisms discussed in Badeeb et al. (2017) lead to a 
larger size of government, which in turn could hinder growth. 
Although authors have previously investigated evidence of Rodrik’s (1998) 
“compensation hypothesis”, none has checked a period of high turbulence such as the 2000s 
commodity boom in Latin America to search for evidence supporting the increase in government 
size as a response to the increased volatility brought about by larger trade openness. In the 
following section, we provide details on the data and methodology used in this study. 
 
2.2 Latin America and the 2000s Commodity Boom 
The 2000s commodity boom is considered the largest commodity supercycle since the 
two post-World War II commodity booms which took place in the early 1950s and early to mid-
1970s. Each of the first two booms lasted around two years as macroeconomic policies were 
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employed to tackle inflation in the developed economies – the largest consumers of commodities 
(Baffes et al. 2008; Radetzki 2006). The most recent commodity boom is different from these 
previous booms because it combines a strong macroeconomic expansion in the period with a 
large use of commodities in emerging markets (Radetzki et al. 2008).  
The Latin American region is one of the most commodity-dependent regions within the 
emerging market world. According to Harrup (2016), the region’s exposure to commodities is 
unique in the world, even greater than middle-income African countries. Besides, the rebound in 
Latin American economic growth in the 2000s is often attributed to the commodity boom 
(Rosnick and Weisbrot, 2014). 
About five decades ago, Latin America’s dependence of commodities had an extra 
ingredient: most of the countries relied on a single commodity. Coffee is the commodity that has 
been exported by most Latin American economies. Blumenfeld (1961) demonstrates that, 
between 1957 and 1959, the following countries’ exports were extremely dependent on coffee, 
by value: Brazil (58%), Colombia (77%), Costa Rica (51%), El Salvador (72%), Guatemala 
(72%) and Haiti (63%). Today, although Latin America is less dependent on coffee around 50% 
of the world’s coffee production still comes from the region (Faostat, 2017). 
Ocampo (2017) shows that Latin America’s dependence on natural resource-intensive 
exports increased during the 2000s commodity boom. Today, crude oil, copper, iron ore and 
soybeans are the top exported commodities produced in Latin America. The UN Comtrade 
(2017) database shows that these four commodities together account for 24.2% of Latin 
American exports: crude oil with 13.3%, followed by copper (4.9%), iron ore (3.0%) and 
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soybeans (3.0%).1 Also, these four commodities accounted for 80% of Latin America’s exports 
to China in the period from 2008 to 2014 (Casanova et al., 2016) and a recent study by Vianna 
(2016) provides evidence that exports to China are important to Latin American economic 
growth. The percentages of commodity dependence of each Latin American country are very 
large. Ocampo (2017, Table 4.1) shows that the percentages of natural resource dependence of 
19 Latin American exports are as high as 96% for Bolivia, 94% for Ecuador, 93% for Venezuela 
and 91% for Paraguay, with only three exceptions: Mexico (24%), El Salvador (27%) and Costa 
Rica (23%). Large countries such as Brazil (63%) and Argentina (65%) also show high levels of 
natural resources exports dependence.  
The period from 1995 to 2002 represents an era of economic deterioration in Latin 
America. Calvo and Talvi (2005) discuss the negative effects of the Tequila crisis in 1995 and, 
later, the Russian crisis of 1998 on capital inflows to the region. The shortage in those capital 
flows lasted until the end of 2002 (Izquierdo et al., 2008).  From 2003 to 2007, the global 
economy rose more than 4% each year, the highest economic growth sequence since the early 
1970s. China has grown 73.5% in this 5-year period, speeding up from 10 to 14.2 percent yearly 
growth, at the same time that the prices of many mineral materials began to increase in 2003. 
(International Monetary Fund, 2016). 
 
3 The Data and Methodology 
Our analysis starts with a fixed-effects approach following Benarroch and Pandey (2008). 
Focusing on the coefficients of openness, terms-of-trade volatility and their interaction term, we 
 
1 Crude oil is a major commodity in Latin America. The largest oil exporters in the region are Argentina, Brazil and 
Venezuela. Iron ore production in the region comes mainly from Brazil. Chile is the largest copper producer 
worldwide, while Brazil and Colombia are in the top three exporters of coffee (UN Comtrade, 2017). 
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investigate whether an increase in the dependent variable government size is associated with an 
increase in those variables of interest, in an effort by the government to compensate for the 
increased volatility as hypothesized by Rodrik (1998). 
We perform fixed-effect panel-data regressions using yearly data from 18 Latin American 
countries in 1990-2014, a 25-year period.2 The choice of the Latin American region for the panel 
data analysis is based on homogeneity of the group of countries. Country selection criterion is 
based on data availability of World Development Indicators (WDI) from the World Bank. The 
18 Latin American countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.3 In addition, we select the region because of its 
economic growth rebound in the 2000s, a change often attributed to the commodity boom 
(Rosnick and Weisbrot, 2014). A recent article in the Wall Street Journal (2016) reviews the end 
of the commodity boom and the negative effects for economic growth in the region: “South 
America’s exposure to commodities prices is unique in the world”, says Augusto de la Torre, 
World Bank chief economist for Latin America and the Caribbean, explaining that not even 
middle-income African countries have such a strong exposure. 
Table 1 reports the variables definitions and descriptive statistics. All measures are 
extracted from the WDI database. Over the whole time span, government size increases 3.21% 
on average, from 10.48% to 13.69% of GDP. This increase is more substantive if we consider the 
lowest value in the series of 9.69% of GDP in the year 1992. Trade Openness (OPEN) is 
 
2 We run the Hausman test for the regressions in Tables 3 to 5 below to help select between the Random Effects and 
the Fixed Effects methods. The null hypothesis is that the preferred method is Random Effects, while the alternative 
hypothesis is that the only consistent model is Fixed Effects. The resulting p-values are below 0.05, which suggests 
that Fixed Effects methods be adopted. 
3 Nicaragua was originally in the sample but was excluded since its measured government size varied erratically in 
the beginning of the 1990s. 
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calculated as (Xit + Mit)/GDPit, where X is exports, M is imports and GDP is the gross domestic 
product of country i at time t. OPEN has a sharp increase from 51.81% in 1990 to 63.74% of 
GDP in 2014. Terms-of-trade volatility (TOTVOL), the deviation from the mean of the terms of 
trade index value (price of exports divided by imports, varying by country), has a mean close to 
zero and is depicted in Figure 1. The Latin American population in our sample has grown from 
421.4 million in 1990 to 597.8 million in 2014, an increase of 41.9%. Even with this population 
increase, the real per capita GDP grew from US$ 1,911 in 1990 to US$ 7,940 in 2014. The 
average urbanization rate has moved up from 61.32 to 73.56% in that period. The dependency 
ratio, a measure of the number of dependents to the working-age population, has dropped from 
74.73 to 55.16% between 1990 and 2014, in line with economic growth. 
Table 2 displays the correlation coefficients between the variables in this study. The 
correlation coefficients do not suggest high values, except for some controls used in previous 
papers in this literature: real GDP per capita and urbanization rate (0.80), real GDP per capita 
and dependency ratio (-0.80), and urbanization rate and dependency ratio (-0.76). In addition, 
population has a negative correlation with openness (-0.68). See below for more on the choice of 
controls to be used in the estimations.  
Figure 1 reports a long positive sequence of terms-of-trade volatility in the years 2003-
2010.4 The exceptions are years 2008 and 2009 which correspond to the global financial crisis. 
Moreover, the high terms of trade volatility in 1994 may be associated with trade gains at the end 
 
4 We follow Radetzki (2006) by determining 2003 as the initial year of the commodity boom period. More recent 
studies have considered 2010 as the last boom year, in line with Figure 1. Studies which focus on particular types of 
commodities, such as Lucotte (2016) for correlations of oil against six food commodity price indexes (cereals, dairy, 
meat sugar, vegetable oils, and a composite food price index) choose the pre-food crisis from 1990 to 2006 and the 
post-food crisis from 2007 to 2015.   
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of the Uruguay Round, a GATT round that lasted from 1986 to 1994 and culminated with 
WTO’s creation.5 
We implement the model used by Benarroch and Pandey (2008) as follows: 
ln(GOV_SIZE)it = α0 + α1 ln(OPEN)it–1 + α2 TOTVOLit–1 + 
                α3 [ ln(OPEN)it–1 (TOTVOL)it–1] + β ln(X)it + ηi + εit                             (1), 
where variables for country i at period t are in natural logarithm terms (ln). The dependent 
variable ln(GOV_SIZE) is the natural log of government expenditures as a share of GDP; 
ln(OPEN) is the natural log of trade openness, lagged by one period to minimize endogeneity 
problems; TOTVOL is terms-of-trade volatility, calculated as the deviation from the mean of the 
index value (price of exports divided by imports, varying by country) also lagged by one period, 
as well as a lagged interactive term [ln(OPEN)t-1 x TOTVOLt-1]; X represents the control 
variables used in the literature in natural log terms: real GDP per capita (GDPCAP); population 
(POP); rate of urbanization (URBAN); and dependency ratio (DEP). We also include country-
specific fixed effects (η) and an iid error term (ε). 
Dynamic models allow for better estimates when including the one-period lagged 
government size (GOV_SIZE) in the right-hand side of the equation. As a first pass, we employ 
the fixed-effect estimators used in (1), which enable us to observe the increase in the model fit 
(R2) in those regressions once lagged government size is taken into account. This model will be 
next verified by a system generalized method of moments (SGMM) approach in order to better 
address the endogeneity issue. The model allowing for lagged government size is as follows: 
 
5 GATT is the abbreviation for General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The World Trade Organization (WTO) 




ln(GOV_SIZE)it = γ0 + γ1 ln(GOV_SIZE)it–1 + γ2 ln(OPEN)it–1 + γ3 TOTVOLit–1 + 
γ4 [ln(OPEN)it–1 (TOTVOL) it–1] + µ ln(X)it + ηi + εit                        (2), 
 
where a lagged dependent variable ln(GOV_SIZE) is inserted in the right-hand side of the 
equation. In the SGMM regressions, we assume that GDPCAP, URBAN and DEP, alternatively, 
are the endogenous variables in the model in order to address the reverse-causation bias. For 
example, government expenditures are part of GDP, and may be more directed to urban areas of 
a country, or may affect the dependency ratio via welfare and transfer programs. We alternate the 
control variable measures GDPCAP, URBAN and DEP subject to a multicollinearity, since they 
show high correlation coefficients (see Table 2). TOTVOL is employed as a purely exogenous 
variable to government size, consistent with the literature on terms-of-trade volatility or shocks. 
The presence of the interactive term captures the simultaneous openness hypothesis as put 
forward by Baltagi et al. (2009) on financial development (such as private credit) depending on 
trade and financial openness.6 In our case, we have the level of openness and the volatility of 
terms of trade as key variables to explain government size, conditioned on the vector X. Both 
key variables are, by construction, determined by trade considerations governing the level of 
trade relative to GDP and also the terms of trade volatility as the ratio of price of exports to 
imports. Taking the partial derivative of ln (G/Y) to ln (OPEN) in (2) above yields γ2 + 
γ4TOTVOLit–1 and the partial derivative of ln (G/Y) to (TOTVOL) yields γ3 + γ4ln(OPEN)it–1. 
Both expressions can be evaluated at sample means as indicated in Table 1: the mean of OPEN is 
 
6 The approach with direct and indirect (interactive) effects has been used in many areas, including foreign capital 
inflows. Research work by Desbordes and Wei (2017), for example, assumes FDI flows respond to interactions 
between source and destination countries’ financial development and the financial vulnerability of a sector. 
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62.17 and the mean of TOTVOL is 0.01. Furthermore, in order to avoid the over-identification 
bias associated with the proliferation of instruments we follow the collapse approach by 
Roodman (2009) and limit the model up to six lags to achieve a number of instruments smaller 
than the number of countries. 
 
3. The Results 
Table 3 reports panel data fixed effects regression results using equation (1). The 
specifications used are based on Benarroch and Pandey’s (2008), where they alternate some 
controls. However, as we will show after the analysis of the results in Table 3 those 
specifications are subject to the multicollinearity bias, since some controls variables are highly 
correlated. In any case, we start our analysis by comparing our results with those authors’ and 
later proceed to model specification adjustments. Columns 1-5 show regression results for the 
pre-commodity boom period from 1990 to 2002 while columns 6-10 display results for the 
commodity boom period from 2003 to 2010. Trade openness has no significant effect on size of 
government in the pre-commodity boom period, but surprisingly has negative effects on 
government size during the commodity boom with coefficients ranging from -0.36 to -0.29 with 
significance at the 5% (columns 6-7) and 1% level (columns 9-10). This result may indicate that 
trade, which positively impacts GDP in case of trade surpluses7, has such a fast growth level 
during this period that government size is not able to follow its pace. TOTVOL has positive 
coefficients that are significant at the 5% level in the 2003-2010 period (columns 9-10). The 
TOTVOL coefficients are positive and statistically significant during 2008-2010 (2.7 or 2.2) and 
 
7 As in the “expenditures approach” to the calculation of the gross domestic product. 
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outweigh the negative effect of openness or the interaction term (-0.65 or -0.54) on government 
size. 8 
More urban areas require higher government size. In our estimates, URBAN impacts 
government size positively by 0.89%-1.26% only during the commodity boom. For each 1% 
increase in the urbanization ratio the response on government size is statistically significant at 
the 5% (columns 6, 7 and 10) and 10% (column 8) levels. In fact, Latin America increased its 
expenditures on infrastructure (which has reflected on higher urbanization) during the 
commodity boom period due to a more robust budget (more tax revenues) during that decade. 
According to Augusto de la Torre, World Bank Chief Economist for Latin American and the 
Caribbean, “during the commodity boom, Latin America became a global example for its ability 
to make growth benefit the poor” (World Bank, 2016). In Brazil, for example, social programs 
such as “Minha Casa, Minha Vida” (My Home, My Life) placed 10.5 million low-income people 
in 2.6 million housing units throughout the country between 2009 and mid-2016 and increased 
the demand for services and infrastructure as the urban population ratio grew to 84 percent; see 
Pacheco (2016). 
The dependency ratio has a negative effect on the size of government only in the pre-
commodity boom period that ranges from -2.6% (significant at the 1% level) to -1.53% 
(significant at the 10% level). We do not find evidence of a significant impact of population on 
government size. The model fit (R2) varies between 22.1% and 38.7%. 
Table 4 addresses the multicollinearity problem by alternating the highly correlated 
controls (GDPCAP, URBAN and DEP) and removing population size (which has a strong 
 
8 For robustness, we run the same regressions excluding Argentina and Brazil, well-known closed (but very large) 
economies, and the coefficients remain. The corresponding TOTVOL coefficients in columns (9)-(10) are even 
larger and remain precisely estimated: 3.814 and 3.043, respectively. The coefficients on openness and interactions 
remain negative as well. A table with estimates for 16 countries is available upon request. 
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negative correlation coefficient of -0.68 with openness) from our regressions. Columns 1-4 
control for the per capita GDP, columns 5-8 use the urbanization rate as control, and columns 9-
12 adopt the dependency ratio as the control variable. Each of these groups shows regression 
results for the 1990-2014, 1990-2002, 2003-2014 periods and the commodity boom period from 
2003 to 2010, which serve as robustness checks for estimation of equation (1). Results are 
consistent among those groups: OPEN has a negative impact ranging from -0.25 to -0.28 in the 
2003-2014 period and is even stronger during the 2003-2010 commodity boom period, between -
0.29 and -0.36. Its significance level also grows from 5% (or 10% in the equation controlling 
from GDPCAP) to 1% (or 5% in the equation that uses URBAN as control). The TOTVOL 
coefficient is only significant (at the 5% level) during the 2003-2010 commodity boom period 
and ranges from 1.9 to 2.7. The interaction terms are negative and statistically significant in the 
2003-2014 and 2003-2010 periods (except the 2003-2014 period when controlling for DEP), 
with higher significance levels during the 2003-2010 commodity boom. As in the previous table, 
the negative effect of the interaction term on government size is outweighed by the large positive 
impact from TOTVOL. 
GDPCAP is positively related with government size. Its coefficients range from 0.13 to 
0.36 and are significant at the 1% level. URBAN also has a positive association with government 
size with coefficients between 0.97 and 1.68. Coefficients in the 2003-2010 and 2003-2014 
periods are significant at the 1% level. DEP has a negative impact on government size and its 
coefficients range from -0.96 to -2.02. The model fit (R2) in Table 4 varies between 15.9% and 
38.8%, very similar to the previous table but not suffering from multicollinearity. 
Table 5 reports panel data fixed effects regression results using equation (2). Although 
the fixed effects method is not the most efficient estimator to handle lagged dependent variables, 
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we take this step before the SGMM approach (Table 6) to provide robustness to previous 
findings, examine the persistency of government size and analyze the model fit of the fixed 
effects model.9 We adopt a one-period lagged government size in the right-hand side of the 
equation and again keep population size out of our specifications due to its high correlation with 
OPEN. Results show moderate to high persistency of government size, with the lagged term 
coefficients ranging from 0.53 to 0.76 and significant at the 1% level in all 12 regressions. OPEN 
has no direct effect on government size. However, TOTVOL shows strong and significant (at the 
5% level) positive coefficients only during the 2003-2010 commodity boom period, between 
1.54 and 2.13. In line with previous findings, these coefficients are larger than the ones from the 
interaction between OPEN and TOTVOL, which are negative and significant at the 5% level are 
range from -0.364 and -0.499. 
GDPCAP, URBAN and DEP show statistically significant coefficients at the 5% level in 
all 12 regression results, suggesting that the insertion of the lagged dependent variable 
government size improves the significance of control variables. Nevertheless, we can observe 
that TOTVOL and these controls have smaller coefficients than in the previous table after the 
insertion of lagged government size as an independent variable. The model fit (R2) in Table 5 
grows from previous values and ranges between 49.2% in column (4) and 68.1% in column (1). 
Table 6 reports System-GMM regressions also based on equation (2), this time 
addressing more efficiently the endogeneity problem by assuming reverse causation from 
government size to GDPCAP, URBAN or DEP, depending on each specification as previously 
explained. The number of instruments is 16, a result of the use of the collapse tool in SGMM and 
limiting the number of lags up to six. Since the number of countries is 18, this addresses the 
 
9 In addition, a peer reviewer has observed that the lagged term will be correlated with the error term in fixed effects, 
although the bias diminishes with increasing number of observations. 
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overidentification bias proposed by Roodman (2009). The p-values for the AB (2) and the 
Hansen test are above 0.10 which means we fail to reject the null hypotheses of no serial 
correlation and validity of instruments, respectively. 
Government size shows large persistency in SGMM models, with coefficients between 
0.71 and 1.01, and always statistically significant at the 1% level. In Table 6, openness is 
positive and significant in three regressions (columns 2, 5 and 6). However, none of these three 
regressions are significant in the 2003-2010 commodity boom period, suggesting that, during the 
commodity boom, the impact of trade on government size comes from volatility. In fact, 
TOTVOL has a large positive coefficient in all three regressions in the 2003-2010 commodity 
boom period (columns 4, 8 and 12), ranging from 3.83 to 5.74. There is little evidence of a 
negative impact from the interaction OPEN x TOTVOL on government size. Only in column 8, 
during the 2003-2010 commodity boom, there is a coefficient of -0.89 with significance at the 
10% level. In line with previous findings in this paper, this coefficient is outweighed by a strong 
positive TOTVOL coefficient (3.83) that is significant at the 5% level. 
In these SGMM results, the impacts from the control variables are gone or diminished, 
depending on each specification: GDPCAP is not statistically significant, while URBAN is 
positive and highly significant in columns 5 and 6, and DEP is negative and significant at the 1% 
level only in column 10. Therefore, these controls are not significant for the 2003-2010 
commodity boom period.  
On the partial derivatives discussed after equation (2) in the Methodology section, we 
note that the partial derivative of ln (G/Y) to ln (OPEN), when evaluated at sample means 
(means of OPEN at 62.17 and of TOTVOL at 0.01), represented by γ2 + γ4TOTVOLit–1 yields -
0.0089 using the figures from Table 6 (SGMM) for the commodity boom period versus -0.00364 
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using the figures from Table 5 (FEM). This indicates that an increase of openness leads to lower 
G/Y in Latin American countries. Also, when evaluated at sample means the partial derivative of 
ln (G/Y) to (TOTVOL) yields γ3 + γ4ln(OPEN)it–1, which means 0.1587 using the figures from 
Table 6 (SGMM) for the commodity boom period versus 0.0327 using the figures from Table 5 
(FEM). Therefore, we find that the effects of TOTVOL on G/Y are higher during the commodity 
boom period than the effects of openness. The estimated effects under SGMM methods are also 
higher in magnitude than those reported under FEM. 
The SGMM results suggest that the own stochastic process for government size 
(measured by the large persistence implied by the lagged dependent term) and TOTVOL are the 
main factors impacting government size. TOTVOL, in particular, operates according to the 
conjecture by Rodrik (1998) during the commodity price boom. Motivated by Frankel et al. 
(2013), what TOTVOL is doing per se is to help the procyclicality of government expenditures 
with a positive effect on government size. OPEN also does it in theory – in line with Rodrik 
(1998) – but it turns out to be not statistically significant. In some cases, for the commodity 
boom, we find the interactive term to be negative, which actually would help lowering the 
procyclicality of government size, also consistent with Frankel et al. (2013, p. 33), who argue 
that “over the last decade several developing countries have been able to ‘graduate’ in the sense 
of overcoming the problem of procyclicality and becoming countercyclical”. 
 
4. Conclusions 
In panel data and controlling for GDP per capita, Rodrik (1998) reports that neither 
openness nor TOTVOL have statistically significant main effects, but their interaction is 
generally positive and significant. In our case for Latin America, we find a strong positive 
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association between volatility in terms of trade and government size. In periods of so much 
volatility like that observed in the commodity boom period, the size of government increases, 
possibly to handle trade risk. Rodrik (1998, p. 997) notes that “the relationship between openness 
and government size is strongest when terms-of-trade risk is highest”. We find supportive 
evidence in this paper as follows. Rodrik (1998) shows from the government maximization 
problem that as a result of exposure to external risk the optimal level of government size is 
larger. The theoretical framework has the government determining the size of the public sector 
before the specific realization of terms of trade, while there are two ways openness can have an 
impact on government size. One is the level effect; the other is the volatility channel.  
Our evidence suggests volatility is particularly important during the 2003-10 commodity 
boom for the panel of Latin American countries. The evidence found in this paper for the recent 
commodity boom can be compared to longer-run studies, such as Islam (2004), who finds only 
for Australia that government size is positively related to external risk using bounds test for the 
U.S. from 1929 to 1997 and post-WWII data for other countries, thus indicating that time series 
analysis in general is not supportive of the proposition in Rodrik (1998). Also, Epifani and 
Gancia (2009) propose a theoretical framework on how openness can increase government size 
through a terms-of-trade externality and demand for insurance channels. Their findings for panel 
data from 1950 to 2000 are that when they control for the standard deviation of the lagged terms 
of trade and its interaction with openness, both are insignificant and the openness coefficient is 
unaffected. Their long-run conclusion is that globalization may have led to inefficiently large 
governments, which comes from the positive and statistically significant openness coefficient but 
not from the terms of trade volatility. 
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In light of the recent commodity bust and economic crisis in Latin America at the first 
half of the 2010s, some public policy considerations arise from the results herein linking 
government size to terms of trade volatility. First, if more volatility implies increasing 
government expenditure in natural resource dependent countries, one could claim that 
commodity boom episodes represent a great risk to these countries due to the typical 
procyclicality of their fiscal policies. In line with these implications, Calderón et al. (2016, p. 
651) report that “(…) monetary and fiscal policies in developing countries – and, especially, in 
Latin America – are predominantly procyclical”. Using panel data methods for 30 years, 
Brueckner and Carneiro (2017), for instance, explore the effects of terms of trade volatility on 
economic growth and find negative effects in countries where government spending is 
procyclical. In that sense, Frankel et al. (2013, p. 32) explain that “an important reason for 
procyclical spending is precisely that government receipts from taxes or mineral royalties rise in 
booms, and the government cannot resist the temptation or political pressures to increase 
spending proportionately, or even more than proportionately”. Therefore, if governments make 
use of fiscal risk prevention mechanisms such as sovereign wealth funds, the natural resource 
curse can be minimized or avoided.10 
Second, a higher level of diversification should be an ultimate goal for these countries. 
Once we find support for the compensation hypothesis, the sticky nature of government spending 
could generate budgetary risks in times of economic busts. In that case, diversification helps 
mitigate the resource curse: as stated by Badeeb et al. (2017, p. 127), “a nation that is resource 
 
10 For instance, Chile used its fiscal policy tools to save the exports surplus within its sovereign wealth fund, later 
using those resources to compensate for the drastic drop in copper price to US$ 1.40 in 2009 and for the economic 
impact of a severe earthquake in 2010 (Bacha and Fishlow, 2010). 
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abundant may not be resource dependent if it diversifies its production structure”.11 And since 
cultural, institutional and regulatory framework aspects play an important role in the resource 
curse in emerging economies, rent seeking, corruption and economic mismanagement could 
eventually hinder policymakers’ efforts to address the resources curse. Therefore, effective 
public policies should aim at adopting long-lasting rules and goals that could be managed and 
pursued by institutions and society.  
 
11 Note, however, that recent research on commodities has shown that benefits to diversification may change over 
time. Merener and Steglich (2018, p. 332) provide evidence in that direction, showing a large risk reduction as a 
response to diversification in the production of commodities in the 1987–2016 period but “a significant reduction in 
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(a) Terms-of-trade volatility from 1990 to 2014.   (b) Government size (% of GDP) from 1990 to 2014. 
 
 
      (c) Trade openness (% of GDP) from 1990 to 2014.   (d) Real per capita GDP (US$ thousand) from 1990 to 2014. 
 

































Table 1               
Variables definitions and descriptive statistics. 
Panel A: Definitions. 
Variables GOV_SIZE OPEN TOTVOL POP GDPCAP URBAN DEP 
 Government 
expenditures as 







































than 15 or 
older than 






Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank) database. 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics. 
Year GOV_SIZE OPEN TOTVOL POP GDPCAP URBAN DEP 
1990 10.48 51.81 -0.046 421.4 1.91 61.32 74.73 
1991 9.74 53.39 0.010 429.3 2.13 61.89 74.09 
1992 9.69 53.60 -0.018 437.1 2.28 62.45 73.39 
1993 10.51 55.58 0.008 444.9 2.48 62.99 72.63 
1994 10.80 56.34 0.084 452.7 2.74 63.55 71.83 
1995 10.89 57.89 0.033 460.5 2.94 64.12 70.99 
1996 11.06 58.59 -0.005 468.3 3.05 64.67 70.23 
1997 11.53 59.15 0.041 476.1 3.33 65.22 69.44 
1998 11.80 59.02 -0.043 483.8 3.36 65.77 68.60 
1999 12.31 56.27 0.000 491.5 3.16 66.27 67.73 
2000 11.97 60.47 0.020 499.0 3.31 66.77 66.84 
2001 12.61 59.46 -0.032 506.4 3.24 67.30 65.98 
2002 12.51 61.13 0.003 513.7 2.79 67.82 65.09 
2003 12.13 64.59 0.020 520.9 2.80 68.34 64.18 
2004 11.77 67.68 0.039 528.1 3.20 68.85 63.27 
2005 11.71 69.01 0.035 535.2 3.77 69.36 62.37 
2006 11.58 70.82 0.060 542.3 4.31 69.87 61.44 
2007 11.78 70.78 0.030 549.4 5.01 70.36 60.55 
2008 12.04 72.93 0.006 556.5 5.83 70.85 59.68 
2009 13.26 61.07 -0.015 563.6 5.63 71.33 58.83 
2010 12.92 66.66 0.063 570.5 6.69 71.80 58.01 
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2011 12.69 70.28 0.045 577.4 7.44 72.26 57.24 
2012 13.08 68.39 -0.011 584.3 7.86 72.71 56.50 
2013 13.36 65.57 -0.018 32.8 8.18 73.14 55.79 
2014 13.69 63.74 0.001 597.8 7.94 73.56 55.16 
                
Mean 11.84 62.17 0.01 489.75 4.22 67.70 64.98 
                
Difference 3.21 11.93 0.05 176.39 6.03 12.24 -19.57 
                
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank) database. 
Notes: GOV_SIZE, OPEN, and URBAN are measured as % of GDP. TOTVOL is in percentage points (deviations from the TOT 
mean). POP is measured in million people. GDPCAP is measured in US$ thousand. DEP is a ratio. 
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Table 2               
Correlation coefficients.               
Correlations GOV_SIZE OPEN TOTVOL POP GDPCAP URBAN DEP 
                
GOV_SIZE 1.00             
OPEN -0.09 1.00           
TOTVOL -0.03 -0.01 1.00         
POP 0.25 -0.68 0.08 1.00       
GDPCAP 0.40 -0.12 0.05 0.30 1.00     
URBAN 0.39 -0.38 0.05 0.43 0.80 1.00   
DEP -0.50 0.13 -0.03 -0.32 -0.80 -0.76 1.00 






Table 3                       
Panel data fixed effect regressions.                     
Dependent variable: 
ln(GOV_SIZE)                       
  Pre-commodity boom period (1990-2002)   Commodity boom period (2003-2010) 
  1 2 3 4 5   6 7 8 9 10 
                        
ln(OPEN)t-1 0.173 0.170   0.224 0.125   -0.287** -0.286**   -0.364*** -0.332*** 
  (0.268) (0.263)   (0.231) (0.234)   (0.106) (0.103)   (0.118) (0.102) 
TOTVOLt-1     -0.145 -2.84 -2.766       -0.0675 2.684** 2.224** 
      (0.186) (1.616) (1.636)       (0.0914) (0.962) (0.816) 
ln(OPEN)t-1 x TOTVOLt-1       0.696 0.664         -0.648** -0.541** 
        (0.404) (0.407)         (0.228) (0.195) 
ln(GDPCAP) 0.253** 0.233** 0.247** 0.364*** 0.275***   0.00707 0.0121 -0.00590 0.127*** 0.0253 
  (0.0931) (0.0985) (0.0856) (0.123) (0.0919)   (0.0623) (0.0633) (0.0661) (0.0431) (0.0613) 
ln(URBAN) -1.854 -2.184 -1.495   -1.697   0.972** 0.989** 1.256*   0.891** 
  (1.213) (1.303) (0.913)   (1.172)   (0.421) (0.437) (0.663)   (0.378) 
ln(DEP) -2.574*** -1.531* -2.563***   -2.453***   -0.593 -0.684 -0.392   -0.548 
  (0.824) (0.839) (0.859)   (0.787)   (0.428) (0.727) (0.548)   (0.418) 
ln(POP)   1.076           -0.158       
    (0.678)           (0.980)       
Constant 18.30** 13.11* 17.49** -1.323 17.16**   1.911 2.588 -1.191 2.920*** 2.102 
  (7.350) (7.169) (7.131) (1.103) (7.005)   (3.311) (5.636) (5.055) (0.457) (3.051) 
                        
R-squared 26.9% 28.0% 26.4% 22.1% 30.7%   34.7% 34.8% 23.9% 29.6% 38.7% 
Observations 214 214 216 214 214   144 144 144 144 144 
Countries 18 18 18 18 18   18 18 18 18 18 




Table 4                       
FEM regressions alternating strongly correlated controls.               
Dependent variable: ln(GOV_SIZE)    

















                              
ln(OPEN)t-1 0.0694 0.224 -0.266* -0.364***   0.0725 0.158 -0.251** -0.286**   -0.00706 0.0830 -0.280** -0.358*** 
  (0.150) (0.231) (0.139) (0.118)   (0.153) (0.241) (0.102) (0.105)   (0.153) (0.202) (0.132) (0.112) 
TOTVOLt-1 -2.203 -2.34 1.273 2.684**   -2.165 -2.498 1.008 1.900**   -2.256 -2.779 1.043 2.315** 
  (1.645) (1.616) (0.796) (0.962)   (1.679) (1.656) (0.613) (0.739)   (1.628) (1.672) (0.654) (0.854) 
ln(OPEN)t-1 x 
TOTVOLt-1 0.519 0.696 -0.324* -0.648**   0.530 0.718 -0.266* -0.470**   0.548 0.691 -0.264 -0.556** 
  (0.409) (0.404) (0.186) (0.228)   (0.420) (0.419) (0.146) (0.178)   (0.406) (0.417) (0.156) (0.203) 
ln(GDPCAP) 0.177*** 0.364*** 0.131*** 0.127***                     
  (0.0570) (0.123) (0.0428) (0.0431)                     
ln(URBAN)           0.967* 1.678* 1.595*** 1.576***           
            (0.502) (0.820) (0.180) (0.369)           
ln(DEP)                     -0.960*** -2.019*** -1.088*** -1.241*** 
                      (0.241) (0.545) (0.314) (0.272) 
Constant 0.728 -1.323 2.493*** 2.920***   -1.914 -5.197 -3.237*** -3.025*   6.447*** 10.59*** 8.081*** 9.025*** 
  (0.562) (1.103) (0.698) (0.457)   (1.916) (3.062) (0.921) (1.585)   (1.431) (2.486) (1.439) (1.332) 
                              
R-squared 21.4% 22.1% 28.3% 29.6%   18.7% 15.9% 38.8% 35.0%   23.9% 24.5% 34.9% 35.4% 
Countries 18 18 18 18   18 18 18 18   18 18 18 18 
Observations 429 214 215 144   430 214 216 144   430 214 216 144 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Differently from previous table, here the strongly correlated controls 





Table 5                             
FEM regressions with lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side.    
Dependent variable: ln(GOV_SIZE)   






























                              
ln(GOV_SIZE)t-1 0.708*** 0.609*** 0.765*** 0.577***   0.719*** 0.632*** 0.707*** 0.572***   0.709*** 0.601*** 0.732*** 0.531*** 
  (0.0547) (0.0452) (0.0656) (0.113)   (0.0442) (0.0488) (0.107) (0.119)   (0.0563) (0.0541) (0.0802) (0.121) 
ln(OPEN)t-1 0.00929 0.0872 0.0324 -0.0981   0.0123 0.0518 0.0200 -0.0403   0.00426 0.0604 0.0184 -0.112 
  (0.0422) (0.110) (0.0627) (0.0954)   (0.0376) (0.107) (0.0603) (0.0838)   (0.0453) (0.106) (0.0692) (0.0927) 
TOTVOLt-1 -0.795 -1.678 1.170 2.129**   -0.751 -1.589 1.031 1.536**   -0.758 -1.533 1.048 1.875** 
  (0.893) (1.124) (0.707) (0.809)   (0.873) (1.128) (0.612) (0.625)   (0.885) (1.162) (0.623) (0.705) 
ln(OPEN)t-1 x 
TOTVOLt-1 0.206 0.425 -0.280 -0.499**   0.202 0.422 -0.253 -0.364**   0.202 0.407 -0.252 -0.437** 
  (0.221) (0.282) (0.167) (0.195)   (0.219) (0.285) (0.147) (0.154)   (0.221) (0.293) (0.149) (0.171) 
ln(GDPCAP) 0.0640*** 0.211*** 0.0616** 0.0958**                     
  (0.0212) (0.0570) (0.0222) (0.0332)                     
ln(URBAN)           0.325** 0.882** 0.792*** 1.296***           
            (0.132) (0.338) (0.165) (0.229)           
ln(DEP)                     -0.258** -0.775*** -0.471** -0.914*** 
                      (0.0913) (0.257) (0.210) (0.228) 
Constant 0.168 -1.033* -0.0590 0.660   -0.719 -2.969** -2.705*** -4.261***   1.772*** 4.002*** 2.513* 5.364*** 
  (0.164) (0.508) (0.260) (0.469)   (0.468) (1.176) (0.467) (1.098)   (0.552) (1.269) (1.200) (1.372) 
                              
R-squared 68.1% 59.4% 65.8% 49.2%   67.6% 57.1% 67.3% 54.7%   67.4% 57.1% 65.2% 51.3% 
Countries 18 18 18 18   18 18 18 18   18 18 18 18 
Observations 429 214 215 144   430 214 216 144   430 214 216 144 




Table 6                             
System GMM regressions.                         
Dependent variable: ln(GOV_SIZE)                         































                              
ln(GOV_SIZE)t-1 0.742*** 0.710*** 1.000*** 0.976***   0.744*** 0.708*** 1.009*** 0.886***   0.728*** 0.801*** 0.861*** 0.834*** 
  (0.134) (0.116) (0.289) (0.258)   (0.0970) (0.0756) (0.241) (0.236)   (0.108) (0.0874) (0.163) (0.135) 
ln(OPEN)t-1 0.254 0.298** 0.0440 -0.0006   0.192** 0.296* 0.125 0.0447   0.198 0.119 0.0138 0.0454 
  (0.184) (0.135) (0.174) (0.189)   (0.0831) (0.178) (0.110) (0.150)   (0.153) (0.150) (0.0448) (0.0755) 
TOTVOLt-1 1.512 1.152 1.800 4.070*   0.605 -0.0893 0.735 3.826**   1.363 -0.712 4.531 5.737* 
  (2.491) (1.968) (3.885) (2.322)   (2.912) (2.238) (2.699) (1.851)   (3.438) (2.707) (3.967) (3.223) 
ln(OPEN)t-1 x 
TOTVOLt-1 -0.380 -0.311 -0.350 -0.912   -0.0953 0.0489 -0.130 -0.888*   -0.297 0.232 -1.078 -1.383 
  (0.618) (0.469) (1.009) (0.614)   (0.753) (0.583) (0.701) (0.489)   (0.879) (0.706) (0.997) (0.971) 
ln(GDPCAP) 0.00808 -0.0236 0.0294 0.0441                     
  (0.0463) (0.114) (0.0337) (0.0392)                     
ln(URBAN)           0.311** 0.400*** 0.0360 0.106           
            (0.122) (0.0913) (0.171) (0.197)           
ln(DEP)                     -0.139 -0.543*** -0.131 -0.225 
                      (0.227) (0.184) (0.158) (0.284) 
Constant -0.447 -0.277 -0.430 -0.304   -1.442** -2.106** -0.689 -0.352   0.450 2.319* 0.824 1.139 
  (0.614) (0.645) (1.178) (1.159)   (0.634) (0.966) (0.729) (0.789)   (1.632) (1.188) (0.983) (1.329) 
                              
AB(2) test p-value 0.390 0.420 0.986 0.515   0.106 0.112 0.617 0.471   0.830 0.121 0.839 0.549 
Hansen test p-value 0.562 0.273 0.152 0.126   0.431 0.765 0.168 0.337   0.223 0.619 0.224 0.169 
Instruments 16 16 16 16   16 16 16 16   16 16 16 16 
Observations 429 214 215 144   429 214 215 144   429 214 215 144 
Countries 18 18 18 18   18 18 18 18   18 18 18 18 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The variable TOTVOL is specified as the exogenous variable in 
the model while GDPCAP, URBAN and DEP are the endogenous variables in their respective equations; therefore, we assume reverse causation from government size to those variables. 
 
